By Jack Li (auth.)
lt is with nice excitement that I write this preface for Or Li's e-book, wh ich addresses the venerable and vexing matters surrounding the matter of no matter if dying could be a damage to the individual that dies. This challenge is an old one that used to be raised in the past by means of the early Greek thinker Epicurus, who notoriously argued that dying is at no time a damage to its 'victim' simply because ahead of dying there isn't any harrn and after demise there is not any sufferer. Epicurus's end is conspicuously at odds with our prereflective and more often than not our post-reflective-intuitions, and diverse suggestions have for that reason been proposed to refute or stay away from the Epicurean end that loss of life can't be an evil in any case. How then are we to account for our instinct that demise isn't just an evil, yet might be the worst evil: that can befall us? this is often the foremost factor that Or Li addresses. Or Li's e-book explores numerous substitute techniques to the advanced and tough concerns surrounding Epicurus's infamous argument and offers a defence ofthe intuitively believable end that demise can certainly be a damage to the person that dies. This problem to Epicurus's declare that loss of life is rarely a damage to the person that dies is built in terms of an in depth exploration of the problems raised not just via Epicurus, but in addition through his many successors, who've answered variously to the difficult matters which Epicurus raised.
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Extra resources for Can Death Be a Harm to the Person Who Dies?
In the desire-thwarting argument, (3) is a logical consequence of (1) and (2). (2) can be generally accepted. 13 Thus, if the desire-thwarting argument is problematic, then the essential problem should be in (I). In other words, in order to reject the desire-thwarting argument, and, thus, the desire-thwarting 38 CHAPTER TWO theory, the focus should be entirely located on premlse (I) in the desirethwarting argument. Let us now examine premise (I) in the desire-thwarting argument in more detail. In his paper "Harm to Others".
3) Therefore, death is a harm or misfortune for uso Call this argument the 'desire-thwarting argument'. In other words, the desire-thwarting theory, for Luper-Foy, should be expressed by the desire-thwarting argument. Apparently, the desire-thwarting argument is theoretically more satisfactory than the unconditional argument. So understood, the desire-thwarting theory seems very reasonable. However, in the next section, I will show that even the desire-thwarting theory is expressed by the desire-thwarting argument-the best version of the three-it is still problematic.
That is objectionable ... If we are to make sense of the view that to die is bad. it must be on the ground that life is a good and death is the corresponding deprivation or loss. ) Similarly. Williams says: 44 CHAPTER THREE [The Epicurean view 1 takes it as genuinely true of life that the satisfaction of desire, and possession of the praemia vitae, are good things ... But now if we consider two lives, one very short and cut off before the praemia have been acquired. the other fully provided with the praemia and containing their enjoyment to a ripe age, it is very difficult to see why the second life, by these standards alone, is not to be thought better than the first.